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When people lack jobs, opportunity, and ownership of property they have
1
little or no stake in their communities.
—Jack Kemp
I. INTRODUCTION
Intangible digital goods should be traded under similar terms as tangible
goods because without the protections given to physical property, consumers
engaging in digital property transactions are at a significant disadvantage,
2
compared to only a few decades ago. For the past several decades, contracts of

* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May, 2014; B.A., Political
Science, University of California, Davis, 2011. I wish to thank my loved ones for their encouragement and
support. I am also extremely grateful to Professor John Sprankling for his wonderful guidance throughout the
writing of this comment.
1. Committee Endorsed Candidates, HENRIETTA REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE CANDIDATES, http://www.
henriettarepublican.com/candidates.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
2. See generally R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L.
Rev. 577 (2003); see generally Dimitri Konstantas, Trading Digital Intangible Goods: The Rules of the Game 1,
available at http://asg.unige.ch/site/papers/KoMo00a.pdf.
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3

adhesion have become the primary force in the transfer of digital property. These
4
are unilateral contracts between parties on a “take-it-or-leave-it-basis.” Typical
5
contracts of adhesion define digital property transfers as merely a license and
attempt to strip all other rights from the end user by restricting their ability to
6
reproduce, reuse, or transfer property. This is entirely unique and distinct from
7
all other forms of property ownership. For example, a traditional book may be
lawfully resold without prior consent from the copyright owner and its
intellectual content may be reused under the fair use doctrine, which permits
8
limited use of the material without acquiring permission from the owner.
However, an electronic book does not adhere to the same instruments of
9
copyright law. Contracts of adhesion prevent resale of the electronic book
because the sold content is classified as a license; the original distributor retains
ownership of the digital data and tyrannically dictates restrictive measures for the
10
licensee. These doctrines have grown so expansively that distributors are
attempting to apply these restrictive measures to not just digital property, but
11
physical personal property as well. The current system of digital property
transfer disenfranchises consumers and inevitably creates a monopoly on the
distribution of digital materials, since only the original distributer retains the right
12
to sell.
The best solution to this problem is to allow the first sale doctrine to
permeate the veil of contracts of adhesion when dealing with digital
13
transactions. The first sale doctrine allows lawful buyers to resell copyrighted
14
materials. Thus, in the prior example of an electronic book, allowing the first
sale doctrine to break the legal confines of contracts of adhesion would create
3. Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 123, 145 (2008).
4. See id. at 123.
5. See Christopher B. Yeh, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: B. COPYRIGHT: 1. Note: Wall Data Inc. v.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department: License Versus Sale At the Crossroads of Contract and Copyright,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 355, 357 (2007).
6. See Reese, supra note 2, at 578.
7. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 381, 392 (2005).
8. Id.; Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005). See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (Court held users waived their fair use defense by
accepting a contract of adhesion); see also Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright
Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 454 (2002) (arguing that fair use is
still valuable even in the digital context).
9. Madison, supra note 7, at 392. See also Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 8, at 454.
10. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2008).
11. See Chris Kohler, Microsoft Will Let You Resell Xbox One Games–But Publishers May Not,
WIRED.COM, (June 6, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2013/06/xbox-one-used-games/.
12. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First Sales and
Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1889 (2010).
13. See generally Reese, supra note 2.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Reese, supra note 2, at 578.
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parity in regards to the transferability between an electronic book and a physical
15
book. Although European courts have started adopting this solution, the United
16
States court system is still resistant.
This problematic legal imbalance, coupled with a consumer demand for used
digital goods, has left a void that only a few companies have attempted to satisfy
17
due to fear of copyright liability. In 2011, the sale of digital music surpassed the
18
sale of physical shipments (CDs and vinyls). In an effort to recapture these
digital sales, a new startup company, ReDigi, has been attempting to create a
secondary used market for music files by scanning the metadata of a user’s music
19
to determine if it was acquired legally. The program then deletes the music file
and all copies from the user’s computer, and transfers a copy of the file to
20
another willing buyer at a price determined by the buyer or the seller.
The goal of the process is to ensure only the buyer retains the sole music file
21
22
after the sale. However, since copies are inevitably created in the process, U.S.
23
courts are unlikely to allow first sale doctrine applicability. The first sale
doctrine needs to be introduced into digital transactions, and one way to
24
accomplish this is by expanding property ownership to individual digital goods.
This Comment examines the divergent relationship between contract law,
copyright law, and property law when applied to tangible personal property as
opposed to intangible digital property. Intangible digital property is defined as
25
“digital representations of tangible goods.” The effect of the current state of
U.S. law on digital property prevents end users from acquiring ownership of

15. See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. para. 10 (July 3, 2012),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-128/11&td=ALL.
16. See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004);
see generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); see generally Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see generally Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see generally I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
17. See Sarah Abelson, An Emerging Secondary Market for Digital Music, 29 WTR ENT. & SPORTS LAW
8, 8-9 (Winter 2012).
18. Chris C. Anderson, RIAA 2011 Year End Shipment Data Report: Digital Sales King, Physical Sales
Continue Decline, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/28/
riaa-2011-sales-data-digital_n_1386098.html.
19. Abelson, supra note 17, at 8-9; see also Sage Vanden Heuvel, Fighting the First Sale Doctrine:
Strategies for a Struggling Film Industry, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 661, 670 (2012).
20. Abelson supra note 17, at 8; see also Vanden Heuvel, supra note 19, at 670.
21. Abelson, supra note 17, at 11; see also Vanden Heuvel, supra note 19, at 670.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See generally Henry Sprott Long III, Reconsidering the Balance of the Digital First Sale Debate: ReExamining the Case for a Statutory Digital First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media
Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2008) (discussing rights afforded to consumers under the first sale
doctrine with tangible media is missing with identical digital media).
24. See infra Parts II-V.
25. Konstantas, supra note 2, at 1.
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26

digital property due to its heavy reliance on contracts of adhesion. As intangible
digital property consumption increases in comparison to tangible property
consumption, consumers will inevitably be unable to transfer digital goods
27
because legal fictions have overwhelmed real world needs. United States courts
should treat intangible digital property with the same care tangible property has
been given, by allowing the first sale doctrine to enter into digital transactions
regardless of restrictive contract of adhesion terms.
Section II of this comment gives a brief history of digital property
28
protection. Section III of this comment will address the role contracts of
29
adhesion play in digital transfers, along with their strengths and weaknesses.
Overall, the court’s repeated acquiescence to modern contracts of adhesion
30
prevents end user protection. For example, the first sale doctrine has become
inaccessible to consumers and allows distributors of digital property to impose
31
32
“take-it-or-leave-it” contractual terms creating a monopoly on digital goods.
Section IV of this comment identifies the balancing role that the first sale
doctrine plays in other property aspects, and additionally argues that the first sale
33
doctrine should play a vital role in future transfers of digital goods. Section V of
this comment illustrates the European attempt to apply the first sale doctrine in
34
digital transfers and the need for United States courts to join the same rationale.
Failure to do so erodes the Anglo-American legal tradition of ownership of
35
property by the legal fiction of contracts of adhesion. Thus, intangible digital
goods should be traded under similar terms as tangible goods because without the
protections of physical property, consumers engaging in digital property
36
transactions are at a significant disadvantage.

26. See generally Carver, supra note 12 (illustrating the problem with allowing copyright owners to use
end user licenses).
27. Glenn Peoples, Digital Sales Up 10% Over January 2012, BILLBOARD (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1536343/digital-sales-up-10-over-january-2012
(discussing the continued increase in digital music sales); see Brenna Hillier, NPD: Digital sales up 17%, not
enough to reverse industry decline, VG24/7 (Aug. 8, 2012, 11:44 PM), http://www.vg247.com/2012/08/08/npddigital-sales-up-17-not-enough-to-reverse-industry-decline/ (steady increase in digital video game sales).
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Parts III.A-B.
30. See infra Parts III.A-B.
31. Zhang, supra note 3, at 123.
32. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1889 (arguing potential monopoly issues when copy owners use end
user licenses).
33. See infra Parts IV.A-C.
34. See infra Parts V.A-B.
35. See infra Part IV.A.
36. See infra Parts II-VI.
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II. DIGITAL PROPERTY HISTORY
Currently, the law allows tangible personal property the protections of the
first sale doctrine, while the same content in intangible digital form is stripped of
37
these rights. This disparity emerged because historically, digital products have
not been seen under property law as “things” like books, machines, or other
38
tangible items.
In U.S. criminal law, digital property is not included in crimes such as
larceny because it is not a “material object or movement of power” and thus did
39
not fulfill the rigid definition of property. Instead of widening the scope of
property law to encompass intangible digital property, federal legislatures
enacted new and distinct legislation to protect digital mediums from theft,
40
trespass, and other virtual crimes. This shift led to the current laws regulating
digital property, which prevent transferability of digital goods through the use of
41
42
contracts of adhesion and fall short of the accepted norms of tangible property.
The 21st century has seen a massive transfer of traditional physical mediums
such as books, music, and entertainment converted into completely digital
43
forms. This presents many challenges for owners to display first sale doctrine
44
defenses because unintended copies are inevitably being created. “[A] user’s
37. See infra Parts III-IV.
38. Madison, supra note 7, at 462.
39. Moonho Song & Carrie Leonetti, The Protection of Digital Information and Prevention of its
Unauthorized Access and Use in Criminal Law, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 526 (2011). See
generally Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 39, 71 (2011) (discussing the
complexities of rigid definitions of property crimes which cannot easily adapt to rapid changes in technological
advancements).
40. Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 523-24; see also ALA. CODE § 13A-8-1(10) (1994) (intangible
property included in definition of property); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1801(A)(12) (2001)
(“‘[p]roperty’ means anything of value, tangible or intangible, including trade secrets.”); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-36-101(7) (2003); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.012(4)(b) (West 2005); see also ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 352(1)(B) (1983); see also MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 556.063(13), 570.010(10) (West 2012); see
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(61)(k) (West 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-509(5) (West 1995); see
also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 637:2(I) (1996); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(g) (West 2004); see
also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-12(F) (West 2004); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 164.005(5) (West 2003); see
also tit. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3901 (West 2007); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(35) (2003); see
also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-106(a)(28) (West 2003); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(5)(B) (West
2004-2005); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-401(1) (West 2003); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1104(a)(viii) (2003) (defining property as anything of value as opposed to a material object). See generally Marc
D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 6 UCLA J.L.
& TECH. 1 (2002).
41. See Carver, supra note 12, at 1915 (explaining the Economic Realities Approach and Perpetual
Possession Approach).
42. See Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 525.
43. Sulin Ba et al., Small Companies in the Digital Economy, in UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY: DATA, TOOLS, AND RESEARCH 185, 187 (Erik Brynjolfsoon & Brian Kahin eds., 2002). See
Consumers are Buying Digital Goods in New Ways, INTERNET RETAILER (May 28, 2010, 2:04 PM),
http://www. internetretailer.com/2010/05/28/consumers-are-buying-digital-goods-new-ways.
44. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010).
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computer will automatically copy software into the computer’s random access
45
memory (‘RAM’), which is a form of data storage.”
46
Simply uploading or downloading can make multiple copies. For example,
items required for the user to perceive and interact with the file when
downloading such as, modems, routers, web browsers, video decompression
chips, and display boards all create unintended copies as the computer
manipulates the electronic signal of the file and converts it into a visual
47
representation on a computer screen. This is why Congress enacted the essential
48
step defense to allow software users who are “owner[s] of a copy” of a software
program to make these copies that inevitably occur via tasks required to run the
49
software, such as installation. Yet, Congress has not acted to allow users the
ability to become owners of the software, which is a necessary requirement to use
50
the first sale doctrine. As a result, consumers of these digital medium have lost
51
protections once afforded to them under traditional physical mediums and have
52
undue copyright liability placed upon them.
Previously, physical mediums, such as a book, had three doctrines regulating
53
its use and sale. First, common law property rights instilled ownership upon the
54
rightful buyer’s personal property. Second, copyright law protected the original
creator of the work by preventing use or copy of the intellectual properties
55
contained within the book. Finally, the first sale doctrine allowed resale of the
56
book by the buyer even though it was copyrighted.
Yet, since property is limited to a “material object or movement of power,”
57
electronic symbols created via a computer are not considered property. Thus,
when one constructs a document on the computer, they own only the intangible
copyright associated with that work of authorship and have no common law
58
property rights in the digital file, only a copyright to the file. However, when
45. Id.
46. Mark A. Lemley, Copyright Owners’ Rights and Users’ Privileges on the Internet: Dealing with
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 547, 555 (1997).
47. Id.
48. 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (1998).
49. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109.
50. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.1993) (customers were licensees who
were not entitled to claim the essential step defense). See Triad Sys. Corp v. Se. Exp. Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th
Cir. 1995). See Reese, supra note 2, at 578 (mentioning the “wait and see approach” taken by Congress).
51. See Reese, supra note 2, at 610-15 (discussing digital networks and technological protection
measures).
52. Lemley, supra note 46, at 555; Alfred C. Yen, Entrepreneurship, Copyright, and Personal Home
Pages, 75 OR. L. REV. 331, 333-34 (1996).
53. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1908).
54. Madison, supra note 7, at 392; see also Depoorter & Parisi, supra note 8, at 454.
55. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
56. Reese, supra note 2, at 577.
57. Song & Leonetti, supra note 39, at 526.
58. See Adobe Sys. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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compared with someone who wrote the same document on a piece of paper, this
author owns the copyright attributed to that work of authorship and has common
59
law property rights in the paper itself. This result gives the digital author
tremendous power because the supply of his work will be smaller in the digital
realm, since his work can never be resold or transferred under the first sale
60
doctrine. This creates a situation in which the intangible buyer is at a
tremendous disadvantage because there is no secondary market to drive prices
61
down.
Even if the digital file was considered tangible property, contracts of
adhesion typically prevent ownership of an electronic book by classifying it as a
lease, which precludes the first sale doctrine because the buyer does not actually
62
own anything. In order to gain parity between digital goods and tangible goods,
the first sale doctrine, along with digital ownership and bars to restraints of
alienation of digital property, are necessary.
Without the protections of physical property, consumers engaging in digital
property transactions are at a significant disadvantage when compared to a few
63
decades earlier. Intangible digital goods can and should be traded under similar
64
terms as tangible goods.
III. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION
In order to transfer intangible digital property, consumers must overcome the
use of standard license terms commonly referred to as contracts of adhesion,
65
which restrict the transfer of digital property. This can be accomplished by
66
allowing the first sale doctrine to overwrite any restriction on transferability.
Almost all exchanges of digital property are accompanied by a contract of
67
adhesion in the form of an end user license agreement. A contract of adhesion is
a contract between two parties where the terms and conditions of the contract are
set by one party, and the other party is placed in a “take-it-or-leave-it” position
68
with little or no ability to negotiate more favorable terms. Traditional contracts

59. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
60. Reese, supra note 2, at 578.
61. Id. at 625-26.
62. See Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (providing an example of the buyer owning the CD-ROM but
not the software because of an agreement).
63. Reese, supra note 2, at 610, 612.
64. Konstantas, supra note 2, at 9-10.
65. Zhang, supra note 3, at 146.
66. See generally Reese, supra note 2.
67. Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering Copyright, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1179, 1180 (2012).
68. Zhang, supra note 3, at 124-25.
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require a multilateral meeting of the minds between parties, whereas an adhesion
69
contract can infer assent to unilateral terms.
Courts have grappled heavily with enforcing contracts of adhesion due to
70
unfairness among the negotiating parties. Overall, most U.S. courts reject claims
71
that a party lacked assent by failing to read the terms and have found that the
role of contracts of adhesion in promoting economic efficiency and reducing
72
transaction costs outweighs the potential for inefficient and unjust terms.
Three distinct but legally similar contracts of adhesion have arisen: shrink73
wrap, click-wrap, and browse wrap agreements. Shrink-wrap agreements are
typically imposed in the retail of physical software packages containing written
license agreements that become effective as soon as the customer removes the
74
wrapping from the package. Click-wrap agreements usually dictate E-commerce
transactions on the internet by which a party may assent by clicking “I agree” or
75
typing a specified set of words. Browse-wrap agreements are electronic form
agreements provided on a website where users can examine the terms without
76
expressly agreeing to them. Even though the party has not assented by clicking
“I agree,” the user’s assent is assumed in browse-wrap agreements when the user
77
performs certain actions such as software installation. Today, users agree to
78
multiple types of contracts of adhesion on an almost daily basis.

69. See id. at 123.
70. Courts that have found these types of licenses invalid characterize them as contracts of adhesion that
are unacceptable. Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). However, other courts have
held that these types of licenses are valid and enforceable contracts. See generally ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill, 105 F.3d 1147; see generally Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see generally I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv.
Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002).
71. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Schillachi v. Flying
Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F. Supp. 1169, 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting 8 PENNSYLVANIA LAW
ENCYCLOPEDIA § 83: “[i]t is common sense and an accepted rule of law that a person has a duty to read the
contract before executing it, and his failure to do so will not excuse his ignorance of the contents.”). See Univ.
of Miami v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 166 F.App’x 450, 453 (11th Cir. 2006) (failing to read the contract is no
excuse); see also Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869 (D. Or. 2002) (explaining that
consumers do have a responsibility to read their contracts and a mere failure to read is not a valid defense to
contract formation).
72. Meridian Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006); see
also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
73. Zhang, supra note 3, at 125-26.
74. Id. at 126; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
75. Zhang, supra note 3, at 124-25; see also Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through Agreements:
Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401 (2001); see also Cheryl B. Preston &
Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from
Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 17-18 (2011).
76. Kunz et al., supra note 75, at 401.
77. Zhang, supra note 3, at 125-26; see also Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 18.
78. Kenneally, supra note 67, at 1180.

160

07_RICHARDSON.EICREVIEW.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/17/2014 5:20 PM

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 27
A. Benefits of Contracts of Adhesion
Proponents for contracts of adhesion stress their ability to attain market
79
efficiency. The theory relies upon the assumption that quick contracts and loose
requirements directly promote economic efficiency because they reduce
80
transaction costs between parties. As a result, courts refrain from putting
pressure on contract drafters to produce balanced contractual terms among the
parties because, in a competitive market, consumers can pay more for better
81
terms.
Under this theory, sellers have little incentive to take advantage of the buyer
82
because they risk lowering their reputation. In addition, the buyer does not incur
the risk of reputation loss because, in a competitive market, the buyer can seek
83
other available distributors. As a result, the appearance of one-sided terms may
84
not be one-sided after all. The seller’s reputational considerations and
disinclinations to sue consumers are a significant cost for the seller and, as a
85
result, the seller behaves in the consumer’s best interests.
Another rationale is that competitive markets force sellers to accommodate
86
buyers. Competitive markets allow contracts of adhesion to afford better terms
87
to buyers because sellers can charge a higher price for the more favorable terms.
However, in many situations, digital goods are equal to or more expensive than
88
their physical counterparts. Despite lower production, manufacturing, shipping,
and marketing costs, the cost of entertainment has not gone down in the past
89
thirty years. In addition, Apple was found violating the Sherman Antitrust Act
by fixing prices of its Ebooks at unlawfully high prices in order to increase
90
revenue. These actions are clearly contradictory to what is in the best interests

79. See Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 12.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets,
104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 830 (2006).
83. See generally id.
84. See generally Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 830.
87. Id. at 833.
88. E-Book Readers Face Sticker Shock, THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052970204336104577096762173802678-lMyQjAxMTAxMDEwNT
ExNDUyWj.html?mod=e2tw#articleTabs%3Darticle.
89. Scott Monkman, Corporate Erosion of Fair Use: Global Copyright Law Regarding File Sharing, 6
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS & TRADE L. 265, 280 (2006).
90. United States v. Apple Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2826, 2013 WL 3454986, at 59 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013)
(ruling that Apple conspired to restrain trade by fixing prices in violation of Section of the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
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of the consumer and, without other methods to lower the price, such as secondary
91
markets, the consumer has no option but to accept these inflated prices.
B. Drawbacks of Contracts of Adhesion
The major flaw with using reputational considerations as a basis for party
92
equality is that consumers are ill-informed about the behavior of sellers. The
burden of becoming informed and digesting the lengthy and cumbersome
legalese of online contracts of adhesion is a significant cost imposed upon the
93
consumer. As a result, buyers engage in rational ignorance because the cost of
acquiring full knowledge is outweighed by the desire to complete the transaction
94
promptly. Since consumers are ill-informed about sellers, sellers rarely incur
reputational costs and can take advantage of the consumer via unfair contractual
95
terms restricting use and transfer.
Even more troubling, many contracts that attempt to assert legal rights on
96
behalf of the distributer frequently contain outright misrepresentations. For
example, various publishers require permission and compensation for the works
of William Shakespeare, Henry David Thoreau’s “Walden” (1854), Charles
Darwin’s “The Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals” (1872), or Jane
97
Austen’s “Sense and Sensibility” (1811). These works are without a doubt in
98
the public domain and require no permissions to recreate. Distributers engage in
these actions to discourage economic competition, resulting in increased costs
99
and restrictions on legitimate fair use rights.
Many terms in contracts of adhesion are in fact unfair, onerous, and
overreaching, but are nonetheless allowed by courts because they do not reach
100
the standard of unconscionability. Unconscionability can be satisfied by a

91. See generally Dan Moren, The Apple Ebook Price-Fixing Suit: What it All Means, MACWORLD (June
3, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/2040598/the-apple-ebook-price-fixing-suit-what-it-allmeans.html.
92. Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82, at 832.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 830, 832.
96. John Tehranian, Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 994-95 (2012); see also
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1076 (2006).
97. Tehranian, supra note 96, at 1003.
98. See Peter B. Hirtle, Recent Changes To The Copyright Law: Copyright Term Extension, ARCHIVAL
OUTLOOK (Jan./Feb. 1999), available at http://copyright.cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm.
99. See Tehranian, supra note 96, at 995.
100. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (reasoning that unconscionability is
not determined on its face but rather alongside an inquiry into the circumstances under which a contract was
executed). See generally Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 82, at 829. But see Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463,
465 (Pa. 1966) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining); but see also Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 364 (Utah 1996) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining);
but see also State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 284-85 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a contract of
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showing of substantively “overly harsh or one-sided results” and procedural
101
oppression through unequal bargaining or “surprise through hidden terms.” Of
particular concern are terms that restrict transferability in regards to rights of
102
survivorship. One example is restrictions that grant online service providers the
right to permanently delete accounts that breach a term of service, which in the
103
process deletes all associated documents and correspondence. Many users do
not want information about banking accounts, business transactions, reservations,
schedules, or similar critical information being deleted under the sole discretion
104
of another. Similarly, many may be shocked to discover that upon the death of
a spouse, partner, or employer, a service provider can delete or withhold all
105
content created by the decedent. Copyright law would be of no avail because it
does not include a right to prevent the destruction of a copy lawfully obtained;
106
only common law property rights could protect the user.
IV. THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
The first sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law limits the exclusive right of the
copyright owner to distribute copies of the copyrighted work by allowing those
107
who buy copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies. The first sale
doctrine is a doctrine in copyright law that hearkens back to the law’s historic
108
disfavor of restraints on the alienation of personal property. As a result, one
109
who owns a copy of a copyrighted work may resell the copy or give it away.
However, the first sale doctrine is unavailable to digital property consumers

adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining); but see also Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 430
A.2d 638, 640 (N.H. 1981) (finding a contract of adhesion unconscionable for unfair bargaining).
101. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
102. See Tyler G. Tarney, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death, 40
CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 796 (2012).
103. Preston & McCann, supra note 75, at 12.
104. Id.
105. See James D. Lamm, Digital Property: Planning for Incapacity and Death, GRAY PLANT MOOTY 4
(June 7, 2010), available at http://www.gpmlaw.com/uploadedFiles/Resources/Articles/Digital_Property
_Planning_for_Incapacity_and_Death.pdf. See generally, e.g., Brandon Giggs, Can Bruce Willis leave his
iTunes music to his kids?, CNN (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/03/tech/web/brucewillis-itunes/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (asserting that famous actor Bruce Willis was not able to bequeath his
songs on iTunes because when he purchased the music, he agreed to iTunes’ terms not to do so); see generally,
e.g., Becky Yerak, Online Accounts After Death: Remember Digital Property When Listing Assets, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Aug. 26, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-26/business/ct-biz-0826-digital-assets—
20120826_1_online-accounts-digital-assets-digital-property (identifying that Yahoo’s terms of service does not
allow a right of survivorship or transferability in regard to its user’s account).
106. See Tarney, supra note 102, at 784.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Reese, supra note 2, at 580-81.
108. Reese, supra note 2, at 580-81.
109. Id.
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because contracts of adhesion limit the exchange to a lease, precluding ownership
110
of the digital property.
A. Real Property
The right to transfer property, specifically real property, is a cornerstone of
111
the U.S. legal system. Even though the first sale doctrine does not apply to real
property, there lies a historic disfavor toward restraints on alienability within real
112
property transactions. The U.S. property system specifically rejects feudalism,
113
which restricted real property ownership, as a way of life. This rejection of
feudalism is illustrated in common law doctrines restricting the restraint on
alienation of property in favor of more efficient, free market methods of property
114
allocation.
Ownership under feudalism was hierarchical rather than dispersed among
115
116
equal persons. No one was a true “owner” except the King. Lords had the
power to control the terms on which others were allowed access to the lords’
117
lands. Today, landlords still exist, but their powers over tenants are more
118
limited. For example, landlords cannot force tenants to engage in actions
119
against the tenant’s will or restrict access from the tenants. In a way, the
relationships between online digital distributors and users mentioned above
120
resemble a feudalistic landlord-tenant relationship.
“A necessary consequence of . . . a democratic way of life is that . . . some
121
contractual terms must be outlawed and placed out of bounds.” Unfortunately,
the current state of digital property transfer echoes the feudalistic approach to
122
property rights. Until contractual terms regulating all digital property transfers

110. See infra Part IV.C.
111. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 27 (1st
ed. 2009).
112. See Kim, supra note 10, at 1111. See generally Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the
Infrastructure of Democracy: The Fourth Wolf Family Lecture on the American Law of Real Property (2011),
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic150416.files/ID.pdf.
113. Singer, supra note 112, at 6.
114. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 2, at 595.
115. Singer, supra note 112, at 3.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (court ruled that real property owners are not
entitled to prevent service workers funded by the federal government from getting access to workers living on
the owner’s land).
120. See supra Part II.
121. Singer, supra note 112, at 6 (2011). See generally Brief of Appellant, Vernon v. Autodesk, Inc., No.
09-35969 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2010), 2010 WL 894738 (claiming the first sale doctrine serves a critical
democratic value by striking a balance with copyright law).
122. See Reese, supra note 2, at 610-12.
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as leases are reexamined, the feudalistic state of affairs will persist among digital
123
property. As digital transactions continue to increase, it will become more
124
apparent that digital goods should be treated similarly to tangible goods. Even
today, the line between physical real property and digital real property is
125
blurring and the first sale doctrine would allow consumers to escape the pitfalls
126
of a feudalistic digital era.
B. Personal Property
Personal property is afforded more protection than digital property under the
127
128
law. Tangible personal property includes all tangible movable property.
Intangible personal property includes shares of stocks and intellectual property
129
such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks. The main issue in determining a
valid transfer of personal property under the first sale doctrine is whether the
130
transferee lawfully attained ownership.
United States courts have had many conflicts between the first sale doctrine
131
and contracts of adhesion. One such instance involved a company sending
promotional CDs of its copyrighted songs to music industry insiders to advertise
132
and promote sales. The promotional CDs’ label stated:
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the
intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall
constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale
or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under
133
federal and state laws.
The music company intended this to be a shrink-wrap agreement in which
134
the music insiders could have declined assent by returning the CDs. As a result,
the music company sued Troy Augusto for violating the terms of the agreement
135
when he sold physical copies of the CDs acquired from music industry insiders.

123. See generally id.
124. See supra Part I.
125. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97 (PLaintiff contended that operators of the game Second Life
unlawfully confiscated plaintiff’s virtual property and denied access to his property).
126. See infra Part IV.
127. See supra Part I.
128. See, e.g., SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 111, at 161.
129. Id. at 236.
130. See supra Part I.
131. See Meridian Project Sys., 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
132. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
133. Id. at 1058.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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However, the court held that this type of transaction should be categorized as a
136
gift or sale, and not as a license. The categorization as a sale is important
because the court abandoned the contract of adhesion language categorizing the
137
transaction as a “license.” This afforded the industry insiders protection under
the first sale doctrine because the sale classification meant that a transfer of
138
ownership had occurred.
C. Digital Property
“Only those who are ‘owners’ of a copy” are able to exercise the rights of
139
transfer under the first sale doctrine. Due to the invasiveness of contracts of
140
adhesion throughout digital property transfers, copyright owners’ ability to
restrict a transfer is only limited “by the imaginativeness of their end-user license
141
agreements (‘EULAs’).”
The invasiveness of EULAs, as a form of click-wrap contracts, illustrates the
law’s divergent and discriminatory approach to digital property in comparison to
142
other forms of property. One such EULA agreement involved Adobe, a
software development and publishing company, selling educational versions of
143
its software for students and educators at a discount. Even though the software
was contained on a CD-ROM, the court determined that the consumer ultimately
paid for “the software contained on the CD-ROM, rather than the CD-ROM
144
itself,” thus making it a transfer of intangible digital property. The defendant
distributor claimed “it was the rightful owner of the software products and
therefore did not infringe” the software maker’s copyright by digitally “reselling
145
those products, pursuant to the first sale doctrine.” The court held that the end
146
user license agreement contained numerous restrictions on title that were
imposed on the reseller, which limited the reseller’s ability to re-distribute the
136. Id. at 1061-62.
137. See id. at 1064.
138. UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
139. Carver, supra note 12, at 1889.
140. See Zhang, supra note 3, at 146 (reporting that today, the great majority of contracts are standard
form contracts, especially in consumer, business and electronic transactions).
141. Carver, supra note 12, at 1889.
142. See id. at 1896-97 (arguing that in cases of software sales, unlike tangible property sales, too many
courts incorrectly rely only on the language of the agreement to hold that the recipient possesses a “license”
even if the software had been permanently transferred to the recipient).
143. Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
144. Id. at 1055.
145. Id. at 1053.
146. Id. at 1059 (the EULA stated: “‘THIS IS A CONTRACT. BY OPENING THIS PACKAGE YOU
ACCEPT ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT . . . .This package contains
software (‘Software’) and related explanatory written materials (‘Documentation’) . . . . Adobe grants to you a
nonexclusive license to use the Software and Documentation, provided that you agree to the following . . . .The
Software is owned by Adobe and its suppliers.’”).
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software, and thereby conferred a license between the software maker and the
147
reseller.
The Adobe Systems case is strikingly similar to UMG Recordings in that a
contract of adhesion preventing resale was in place and the defendants violated
that clause, yet the cases reached two completely different outcomes in the user’s
148
ability to transfer. By comparing UMG and Adobe, it is quite clear that the
primary distinction to determine whether contracts of adhesion or the first sale
doctrine should control is whether the property is classified as tangible personal
149
property or intangible digital property. UMG Recordings specifically dealt with
a physical CD being exchanged, whereas Adobe Systems only examined the
150
intangible digital software.
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. expands the holding in UMG Recordings to apply to
151
everyday office sales. Vernor bought copies of Autodesk, a form of computer
152
design software, at an office sale and listed four copies on eBay for sale. When
Autodesk petitioned eBay to remove the sales, Vernor sought a declaratory
judgment to establish that the sale of the software was protected by the first sale
153
doctrine and did not infringe Autodesk’s copyright. The court considered three
factors: (1) whether the copyright owner specified the software as a license, (2)
whether the copyright owner significantly restricted the user’s ability to transfer,
and (3) whether the copyright owner restricted the user’s ability to transfer the
154
software. The court reluctantly concluded that Vernor was not an owner of the
software, noting that Congress is free “to modify the first sale doctrine and the
essential step defense if it deems these or other policy considerations to require a
155
different approach.” As a result, tangible personal property receives first sale
protection, whereas intangible digital property receives no protection under the
156
federal court system.
V. ALTERNATIVE TO THE CURRENT DIGITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM
The current law surrounding the transfer of digital property relies heavily
157
upon contracts of adhesion. This allows many benefits such as efficiency

147. Id. at 1060.
148. Compare id., with UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
149. Compare Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1060, with UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
150. UMG Recordings, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1064; Adobe Sys., 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
th
151. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1105, 1111 (9 Circuit 2010).
152. Id. at 1105.
153. Id. at 1106.
154. Id. at 1110-11.
155. Id. at 1115.
156. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
157. See Zhang, supra note 3, at 145 (reporting that today, the great majority of contracts are standard
form contracts, especially in consumer, business, and electronic transactions).
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158

among the parties. However, as stated above, the current effect of the system
prevents the spread and disbursement of digital property by eliminating
159
secondary markets. The American property system’s historic disfavor of
restrictions on alienability and its overall desire to make property accessible to
160
the masses outweighs the perceived efficiency of the current system. For these
reasons, the following section will offer an avenue for the courts to take in order
to establish a fair and equitable system of digital property ownership and transfer.
A. European Court of Justice
A more equitable and efficient alternative to the current digital property
transfer system can be found in decisions by the European Court of Justice
161
(“ECJ”). The ECJ has ruled that the right of software developers to
control distribution of a specific piece of software is exhausted once the software
162
developer has been paid. According to the court, it makes no difference
whether the copy of the computer program was made available by means of a
163
download or on a DVD/CD-ROM. In addition, the software developer cannot
164
prohibit distribution of second-hand sale. Such distribution may not be
165
prohibited by contract, in particular by using EULAs.
However, the ECJ made it clear that an original acquirer of a tangible or
intangible copy of a computer program, for which the copyright holder’s right of
distribution is exhausted, must make the copy downloaded onto his own
166
computer unusable at the time of resale. If the digital good continued to be in
use, it would infringe the copyright holder’s exclusive right to reproduce the
167
computer program. In contrast to the exclusive right of distribution, the
168
exclusive right of reproduction is not exhausted by the first sale doctrine. In
this context, the ECJ also pointed out that the copyright holder may use technical
protective measures, such as product keys, in order to make sure that the original
169
acquirer of the software in fact makes the copy unusable. The decision may
170
171
allow the Redigi business model to take root in the European market. In
158. Id. at 124. See supra Parts III.A-B.
159. See supra Parts IV.A-C.
160. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 111, at 27. See Singer, supra note 112, at 3, 7-9.
161. See generally Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. (July 3, 2012),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-128/11&td=ALL.
162. Id. at para. 72.
163. Id. at paras. 75, 79.
164. Id. at paras. 76-77.
165. Id. at paras. 76-77.
166. See id. at paras. 70, 78.
167. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 70.
168. Id. at para. 73.
169. Id. at para. 79.
170. Abelson, supra note 17, at 8-9.
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effect, this decision restores balance between the seller and buyer because it
allows the first sale doctrine to reenter the legal landscape by allowing digital
172
works to be traded regardless of inadvertent copying. Implementation of this
173
model could be accomplished with ease in courts in the United States.
Courts in the U.S. can escape the problems of the current system by adopting
a modified multi-factor test pioneered by the ECJ, which balances the interests of
174
the distributor and consumer equally. When a transaction involves a completely
digital or intangible good, the court should ask whether a transfer of ownership
has occurred by examining the type of product being sold (service versus good),
the type of payment structure (one-time payment versus continued payments),
and the length of use (indefinite versus temporary), while disregarding contract
175
language stating ownership or lease. The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that anticipatory arrangements via contract could not escape and change the
176
actualities of what has occurred. Likewise, U.S. courts should be less
deferential to the terms of the transaction and analyze what type of transfer has
177
actually occurred.
Returning to the electronic book example, if a publisher sold a book to a
student at a one-time fee for an indefinite period of time, the transaction would
be categorized as a sale conferring ownership regardless of contract language
178
stating otherwise. Similarly, the ECJ’s test allows this same result if the only
difference in the transaction is that the sold book is downloaded or emailed
179
instead of purchased in physical form. As a result, the student would be able to
transfer that copy of the book to another student so long as all control of the book
180
in possession is relinquished to only that one other student. This allows
181
complete parity between digital transactions and tangible transactions.
The main difference between owning a tangible good and leasing a tangible
good is illustrated by the product being sold, the type of payment, and the length
182
of use. With these factors, any real world sale or intangible digital sale can be
183
distinguished between ownership and lease.
171. Id. at 10.
172. See supra Parts III-IV.
173. See generally UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R.
174. See id. at para. 85-88.
175. Id. at para. 8, 84.
176. Daugherty v. Comm’r, 63 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1933). See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)
(“tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements” no matter how skillfully devised or crafted a
contract). See also Luce v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 751, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
177. Reese, supra note 2, at 645-46.
178. See id.; see supra Part I.
179. See generally UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R.
180. See Reese, supra note 2, at 645-46.
181. See supra Part I.
182. See UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 8.
183. Id. at para. 101(1).
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B. The First Sale Doctrine Policy Rationale
Adopting a multi-factor test to determine if sales are in fact leases or
transfers of ownership allows the first sale doctrine to alleviate problems of the
184
current legal structure. In the digital realm, the first sale doctrine would allow
products to be more affordable to the public and help to ensure that works of
185
authorship remain available to the public over time. The right to transfer is vital
for efficiency because it ensures that property is devoted to its most valuable
186
use.
187
From its inception, the first sale doctrine’s goal was to limit the statutorily
188
created monopolies granted to copyright owners. Today, the first sale doctrine
promotes access to knowledge by preserving physical works that would
otherwise be discarded, abandoned, or destroyed to ensure lower market supply
189
and higher economic gains by sellers. An average book has a print life within
190
191
twelve months of initial release and software has an even shorter retail life.
The first sale doctrine allows these works to not only survive past their shelf life,
192
but also to thrive.
As stated above, ownership is the main requirement to enact the first sale
193
doctrine. Since the current practices under contracts of adhesion prevent the
194
transfer of ownership, the first sale doctrine cannot be introduced as a defense.
This is in stark contrast to the congressional history of the first sale doctrine,
favoring copyright to coincide with first sale and, even more, Congress’ recent
enactment of the essential step defense that gives digital works greater protection
195
under the first sale doctrine.

184. See supra Part I.
185. Reese, supra note 2, at 577, 644, 652.
186. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (6th ed. 2003) (argues that the right to
transfer furthers efficiency); Jeremy Waldron, Property Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 9, 13 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010) (1996) (arguing the right to transfer allows the selfperpetuation of the system of private property); SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 111, at 27.
187. Reese, supra note 2, at 585.
188. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51 (1908).
189. Reese, supra note 2, at 584-610.
190. Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass’n et al. in Support of Plaintiff and Affirmance, Vernor
v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), available at https://www.eff.org/node/57024.
191. Pamela Brannon, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing Access to Orphaned Works,
14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 154-55 (2006).
192. Reese, supra note 2, at 584. See Brannon, supra note 191, at 147-48, 154-55.
193. See supra Part IV.
194. See supra Parts III-IV.
195. See supra Part II.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Today’s digital property transactions resemble a feudal system in which the
digital copyright owner is able to dictate the terms and overall use of the property
196
to the end user through use of contracts of adhesion. The United States needs a
unified scheme to replace the current copyright and contract system that protects
not only distributors, but end users as well, and that takes into account all of
197
digital property’s unique features and facets. U.S. courts should treat digital
property as such and prevent contracts of adhesion from disenfranchising
198
consumers from ownership.
The most viable avenue for achieving this goal is to introduce the first sale
doctrine into digital property transactions that resemble real world sales, thereby
permitting items that were previously protected under the first sale doctrine to
199
remain protected.

196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra Part III.
See Yeh, supra note 5, at 355-56.
See supra Part III.
See supra Parts IV-V.
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